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Abstract
We investigate a variant of the two-player voluntary contribution game studied by Compte and Jehiel [2003].
Compte and Jehiel assume that alternate contributions for completing a joint project are sunk costs and agents
cannot commit in advance to a specific sequence of contributions, as is also assumed in Admati and Perry [1991].
We slightly change their assumption as follows: agents can commit to proposals such as: “When it comes to
a situation where my final payment of a certain amount completes the project, I will pay the amount then for
sure.” Although such a commitment to the final step seems a generous proposal at a glance, the commitment
gives the proposer a great advantage in his equilibrium payoff.
1. Introduction
This paper investigates a two-player voluntary contribution game in which agents can commit in ad-
vance to make a certain amount of payment at the final step of completing a joint project before the
agents start alternate contributions that become sunk costs. The game might be regarded as a com-
bination of the contribution game and the subscription game mentioned in Admati and Perry [1991].
They explain the difference between the contribution game and the subscription game as follows. In
the contribution game, commitments and enforceable contracts are not available, and the cost of con-
tributions is sunk. In the subscription game, agents can make conditional commitments to contribute




In their analysis of the contribution game, Admati and Perry’s main concern is a pattern of con-
tributions. They show that contributions are made in small steps along the equilibrium path. They
suggest that the sunk character of contributions is a source of such a step-by-step pattern of contri-
butions. However, Compte and Jehiel [2003] point out that Admati and Perry’s result depends on
convexity of a cost function and symmetry of agents’ valuations of the project. Compte and Jehiel
introduce a linear cost function and asymmetric valuations into Admati and Perry’s contribution game,
and show that at most two large contributions are realized in equilibrium.
Aside from the pattern of contributions, the present paper concerns how agents split the social
surplus in equilibrium. In the equilibrium of Compte and Jehiel’s game, the agent with the lower
valuation gets all the surplus generated by completion of the project while the agent with the higher
valuation gets a payoff of zero, which seems an unfair way of splitting the surplus. In the present paper,
we introduce a different contribution protocol into Compte and Jehiel’s model, and investigate how the
equilibrium payoff profile changes. Specifically, our game gives agents options to make a proposal such
as: “When it comes to a situation where my final payment of a certain amount completes the project,
I will pay the amount then for sure.” After making such proposals, the agents start an alternate
contribution game. We assume that the agents can commit to the proposals at the final step.
In equilibrium of our game, agents split the social surplus in the following way. When only one
agent has an option to propose, the proposer gets all the surplus while the other agent without the
option gets a payoff of zero. On the other hand, when both agents can propose, the surplus is split
relatively fairly between the two in the sense that the both agents get positive payoffs, although the
second mover’s payoff exceeds that of the first mover. Our result indicates that the commitment to the
final step gives an agent a great advantage in his equilibrium payoff.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our model of the
two-player contribution game. Section 3 summarizes the previous results in the literature. Section 4
investigates the case where only one agent has an option to commit to the final step while Section 5
investigates the case where both agents have such options. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We investigate a variant of the two-player voluntary contribution game studied by Compte and Je-
hiel [2003].
Two agents, agents 1 and 2, are the players of the game. They voluntarily contribute to complete a
project, which costs K > 0. The project is a public good for the agents. On completion of the project,
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agent i obtains a benefit Vi > 0, which is called agent i’s valuation of the project. Following Compte
and Jehiel [2003], we focus on the case where max{V1, V2} < K < V1 + V2, which means that neither
agent can afford to complete the project alone and completion of the project is socially desirable.
The game is played in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In period 0, each agent i can simultaneously make a
proposal such as: “When it comes to a situation where my final payment of Ci ≥ 0 at the end of period
t ≥ 1 completes the project, I will pay the amount to complete the project at the end of period t.” We
assume that the agents can commit to the proposals. At the end of period 0, (C1, C2) is observed by
them.
From period 1, they contribute alternately as in the game studied by Compte and Jehiel [2003].
Agent 1 contributes in periods with positive odd numbers while agent 2 contributes in periods with
positive even numbers until the project is completed. Let m(t) denote the mover in period t ≥ 1. That
is, m(t) = 1 if t is a positive odd number while m(t) = 2 if t is a positive even number.
In the middle of period t ≥ 1, agent i with i = m(t) makes a contribution of an amount of cti ≥ 0.
Since two agents take turns in making contributions, we require that cti = 0 if i ̸= m(t): this constraint
on (ct1, c
t




2 = 0 for notational convenience is called the feasibility for contributions.
We assume that contributions are non-refundable even if the project is not completed. So, contributions
become sunk costs for the agents. At the end of period t, (ct1, c
t
2) is observed by them.
The remaining amount required for completion at the end of period t is denoted by






If xt ≤ 0 at the end of period t ≥ 1, then agents 1 and 2 fulfill their proposals by paying C1 and C2,
respectively, at the end of period t.1
Let T denote the period of completion of the project, that is, T is the least natural number that
satisfies the condition xT ≤ 0. When the project is completed, the game ends. If the project is not
completed forever due to an insufficient amount of contributions, then we let T = ∞, and the game
continues forever.
Let ht denote a history at the beginning of period t: we define h0 = ∅ and ht = {(C1, C2), (c01, c02), . . . ,
(ct−11 , c
t−1
2 )} for t ≥ 1. A history ht is non-terminal if xt−1 > 0. A terminal history is denoted by
hT+1; it is an infinite sequence or a history with xT ≤ 0.
We focus on pure strategies. Agent i’s strategy si is a function si(h
t) ≥ 0 that associates with
1In our setting, even if x0 ≤ 0, agents fulfill their proposals at the end of period 1.
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each non-terminal history ht a non-negative real number. We interpret si(h
0) as Ci while we interpret
si(h
t) as cti for t ≥ 1. By the feasibility for contributions, we require that si(ht) = 0 if i ̸= m(t). A list
of strategies (si, sj) with i ̸= j is called a strategy profile.
Both agents discount benefits and contributions using a discount factor δ such that 0 < δ < 1.
Agent i’s payoff evaluated at the end of period 1 for a strategy profile (s1, s2) is given by





where Ci and c
t
i are variables that appear in the terminal history h
T+1 realized by the strategy profile
(s1, s2).
We look for subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. A strategy profile (s1, s2) is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game if, for every subgame of the game, the strategy profile induced by (s1, s2) is a
Nash equilibrium of the subgame.2
Given a history h1 = {(C1, C2), (c01, c02)}, let V̄1 = V1 − C1, V̄2 = V2 − C2, and K̄ = K − C1 − C2.3
We denote a subgame that starts at a history h1 at the beginning of period 1 by a list (V̄1, V̄2, K̄).
3. The Previous Results
This section summarizes the results in the previous studies in the literature as facts in the context
of our model. Throughout the section, we assume that the admissible strategies for each agent i are
restricted in such a way that Ci = 0, i.e., each agent does not have an option to make a proposal to
commit to the final step. We may regard that the previous studies assume C1 = C2 = 0 and analyze
the subgame (V1, V2,K) starting in period 1 in our model. The facts discussed in this section apply to
the subgame (V1, V2,K) as well as all its subgames starting at a non-terminal history.
Suppose that, for t ≥ 1, we have a non-terminal history ht = {(C1, C2), (c01, c02), . . . , (ct−11 , c
t−1
2 )}.
Strategy s̄∗i for agent i in the game such that Vi ≤ Vj, i ̸= j, and C1 = C2 = 0.
We fix s̄∗i (h
0) = 0 by the restriction Ci = 0. When i ̸= m(t), we require that s̄∗i (ht) = 0 by the
feasibility for contributions. When i = m(t), the following descriptions define s̄∗i (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let s̄∗i (ht) = 0.
(ii) If 0 < xt−1 ≤ (1− δ)Vi, then let s̄∗i (ht) = xt−1.
2For the formal definitions of subgame-perfect equilibria and Nash equilibria, readers are referred to Osborne
and Rubinstein [1994].
3It is possible that V̄1 ≤ 0, V̄2 ≤ 0, or K̄ ≤ 0.
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(iii) If (1− δ)Vi < xt−1 ≤ Vj , then let s̄∗i (ht) = 0.
(iv) If Vj < x
t−1 ≤ δVi + Vj , then let s̄∗i (ht) = xt−1 − Vj .
(v) If δVi + Vj < x
t−1, then let s̄∗i (h
t) = 0.
Strategy s̄∗∗j for agent j in the game such that Vi ≤ Vj, i ̸= j, and C1 = C2 = 0.
We fix s̄∗∗j (h
0) = 0 by the restriction Cj = 0. When j ̸= m(t), we require that s̄∗∗j (ht) = 0 by the
feasibility for contributions. When j = m(t), the following descriptions define s̄∗∗j (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let s̄∗∗j (ht) = 0.
(ii) If 0 < xt−1 ≤ Vj , then let s̄∗∗j (ht) = xt−1.
(iii) If Vj < x
t−1, then let s̄∗∗j (h
t) = 0.
We first note that the following Fact 1 is essentially the same as Proposition C2 in Marx and
Matthews [2000]; by applying their arguments in the proof of their proposition, the fact is obtained.








2) are subgame-perfect equilibria





and (s̄∗∗1 , s̄
∗
2) are subgame-perfect equilibria of the subgame (V1, V2,K) and all its subgames starting
at a non-terminal history.
When V1 = V2, there are multiple equilibria in the game. In fact, more equilibria can be obtained
by changing agents’ choices between indifferent alternatives at some histories.
We next note that the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 in Compte and Jehiel [2003] show
the following.




j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game




j ) is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the subgame (V1, V2,K) and all its subgames starting at a non-terminal history.
In this case Vi < Vj also, there are multiple equilibria in the game; other equilibria can be obtained
by changing agents’ choices between indifferent alternatives off the equilibrium paths.
However, the equilibrium path is unique and common among all the subgame-perfect equilibria
particularly when Vi < Vj < K < δVi + Vj . Arguments on the equilibrium path are summarized in
Facts 3 through 8; these facts are obtained in the proof of Proposition 1 in Compte and Jehiel [2003].
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Fact 3. For each agent i, if 0 < xt−1 < (1− δ)Vi for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history
ht with i = m(t), then for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is
such that cti = x
t−1, and the period of completion is t.
Fact 4. When Vi < Vj , if (1− δ)Vi < xt−1 < Vj for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history
ht with j = m(t), then for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is
such that ctj = x
t−1, and the period of completion is t.
Fact 5. When Vi < Vj , if (1− δ)Vi < xt−1 < Vj for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history
ht with i = m(t), then for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is
such that cti = 0 and c
t+1
j = x
t−1, and the period of completion is t+ 1.
Fact 6. When Vi < Vj , if Vj < x
t−1 < δVi + Vj for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history
ht with i = m(t), then for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is
such that cti = x
t−1 − Vj and ct+1j = Vj , and the period of completion is t+ 1.
Fact 7. When Vi < Vj , if Vj < x
t−1 < δVi + Vj for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history
ht with j = m(t), then for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is
such that ctj = 0, c
t+1
i = x
t−1 − Vj , and ct+2j = Vj , and the period of completion is t+ 2.
Fact 8. When Vi < Vj , if δVi+Vj < x
t−1 for a subgame starting at a non-terminal history ht, then
for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame, the equilibrium path is such that cτi = c
τ
j = 0
for all τ ≥ t, i.e., no agent contributes a positive amount thereafter and the project is not completed
forever.
We note that when the equilibrium path is unique, the equilibrium payoff profile is uniquely deter-
mined. Particularly, when Facts 6 and 7 apply, the equilibrium payoff profile is the following.









(δV1 + V2 − K, 0), which is realized along the equilibrium path, c11 = K − V2 and c22 = V2, with the
period of completion T = 2.









(0, δV1 + δ
2V2 − δK), which is realized along the equilibrium path, c11 = 0, c22 = K − V1, and c31 = V1,
with the period of completion T = 3.
Before closing this section, we point out two properties of the equilibria of the game with the
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restrictions C1 = C2 = 0.
First, it is possible that the project is not completed even if completion of the project is socially
desirable. That is, the project is not completed when Vi < Vj < δVi + Vj < K < V1 + V2.
Second, the agent with the lower valuation gets all the surplus while the agent with the higher
valuation gets a payoff of zero. That is, agent 2’s payoff is zero when V1 < V2 by Fact 9 while agent 1’s
payoff is zero when V2 < V1 by Fact 10.
4. The Results for the One-Side Case
We prepare two lemmas before stating our propositions in this section. We note that these lemmas
hold even when C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0, i.e., both agents have options to make a proposal to commit to
the final step. These lemmas will be used also in the next section.
Lemma 1. For any strategy profile (s1, s2) which realizes a terminal history h
T+1 = {(C1, C2),
(c01, c
0




2 )}, the payoff profile (u1(s1, s2), u2(s1, s2)) satisfies the following:
u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) ≤ δT−1(V1 + V2 −K).
Proof. Since completion of the project is socially desirable by the assumption of our model, we
have V1 +V2 −K > 0. If T = ∞, i.e., if the project is not completed forever, then each agent i’s payoff
ui(s1, s2) cannot be positive and hence the inequality in the lemma clearly holds.
If T < ∞, then we have
u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) = δ


















≤ δT−1(V1 + V2 −K)







Lemma 2. For any subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗












Proof. If agent i chooses a strategy si such that si(h
t) = 0 for any non-terminal history ht, then







j ) ≥ 0.
We now investigate our model with the restriction in which only one agent has an option to make
a proposal to commit to the final step. We first consider the game where only agent 1 has the option.
That is, the admissible strategies for agent 1 are such that C1 ≥ 0 while the admissible strategies for
agent 2 are restricted in such a way that C2 = 0. Our proposition says that the equilibrium payoff
profile and the equilibrium path are uniquely determined, regardless of whether V1 < V2 or not.
Proposition 1. If there is any subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) in the game with the restrictions
C1 ≥ 0 and C2 = 0, the equilibrium payoff profile (U∗1 , U∗2 ) ≡ (u1(s∗1, s∗2), u2(s∗1, s∗2)) is such that
(U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (δ(V1 + V2 −K), 0), which is realized along the equilibrium path, C1 = K − V2, c11 = 0, and
c22 = V2, with the period of completion T = 2.
Proof. Since we have the restriction C2 = 0, i.e., since agent 2 does not have an opportunity to
contribute before period 2, if ever T = 1, then it must be the case that agent 1 bears all the cost of
the project, which makes agent 1’s payoff negative since V1 < K. So, we have T ≥ 2 in equilibrium by
Lemma 2, and hence U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≤ δ(V1 + V2 −K) by Lemma 1 and our assumption δ < 1.
We now choose ε > 0 and let C1 = K−V2+ε, V̄1 = V1−C1, and K̄ = K−C1. Since V1 < K < V1+V2
by our assumption, we can choose sufficiently small ε so that 0 < V̄1 < V2 and (1− δ)V̄1 < K̄ < V2.
Consider a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame (V̄1, V2, K̄) starting in period 1. We note
that the previous results in Section 3 apply to the subgame; the remaining amount required for com-
pletion is K̄ > 0, and on completion of the project, agent 1 obtains a net benefit V̄1 > 0 while agent 2
obtains a benefit V2 > 0. By Fact 5, the equilibrium path in the subgame is such that c
1
1 = 0 and
c22 = K̄, and hence agent 1’s equilibrium payoff U
∗∗
1 is such that U
∗∗
1 = δV̄1 = δ(V1 + V2 −K − ε).
Next, consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) of the whole game. Since agent 1 has an
option to choose C1 = K − V2 + ε in period 0, his equilibrium payoff U∗1 must be such that U∗1 ≥ U∗∗1 .
Since we can have ε > 0 arbitrarily close to 0, it must be the case that U∗1 ≥ δ(V1 + V2 −K).
Considering the above inequalities, U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≤ δ(V1 + V2 −K), U∗1 ≥ δ(V1 + V2 −K), and U∗2 ≥ 0
by Lemma 2, we obtain the result (U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (δ(V1 + V2 − K), 0). Furthermore, we obtain T = 2
by Lemma 1 and our assumption δ < 1. The results U∗2 = 0 and T = 2 imply that c
2
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We are left to show C1 = K − V2 and c11 = 0 on the equilibrium path. Since T = 2 and c22 = V2, we
have C1 + c
1
1 ≥ K − V2. We recall that U∗1 = δ(V1 − C1) − c11. By the optimality of agent 1’s choices
on the equilibrium path, we have C1 + c
1
1 = K − V2. So, U∗1 = δ(V1 + V2 −K)− (1− δ)c11, which gets
bigger as c11 gets smaller, and hence the inequality c
1
1 ≥ 0 must bind. Therefore, C1 = K − V2 and
c11 = 0 are the optimal choices for agent 1.
We next consider the game where only agent 2 has an option to propose.
Proposition 2. If there is any subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) in the game with the restrictions
C1 = 0 and C2 ≥ 0, the equilibrium payoff profile (U∗1 , U∗2 ) ≡ (u1(s∗1, s∗2), u2(s∗1, s∗2)) is such that
(U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (0, V1 + V2 − K), which is realized along the equilibrium path, C2 = K − V1 and c11 = V1,
with the period of completion T = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and our assumption δ < 1, we have U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≤ V1 + V2 −K.
We now choose ε > 0 and let C2 = K−V1+ε, V̄2 = V2−C2, and K̄ = K−C2. Since V2 < K < V1+V2
by our assumption, we can choose sufficiently small ε so that 0 < V̄2 < V1 and (1− δ)V̄2 < K̄ < V1.
Consider a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame (V1, V̄2, K̄) starting in period 1. We note
that the previous results in Section 3 apply to the subgame; the remaining amount required for com-
pletion is K̄ > 0, and on completion of the project, agent 1 obtains a benefit V1 > 0 while agent 2
obtains a net benefit V̄2 > 0. By Fact 4, the equilibrium path in the subgame is such that c
1
1 = K̄, and
hence agent 2’s equilibrium payoff U∗∗2 is such that U
∗∗
2 = V̄2 = V1 + V2 −K − ε.
Next, consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) of the whole game. Since agent 2 has an
option to choose C2 = K − V1 + ε in period 0, his equilibrium payoff U∗2 must be such that U∗2 ≥ U∗∗2 .
Since we can have ε > 0 arbitrarily close to 0, it must be the case that U∗2 ≥ V1 + V2 −K.
Considering the above inequalities, U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≤ V1 + V2 − K, U∗2 ≥ V1 + V2 − K, and U∗1 ≥ 0 by
Lemma 2, we obtain the result (U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (0, V1+V2−K). Furthermore, we obtain T = 1 by Lemma 1
and our assumption δ < 1. The results (U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (0, V1 + V2 −K) and T = 1 imply that c11 = V1 and
C2 = K − V1 on the equilibrium path.
Propositions 1 and 2 assume the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2). We next show
that the following strategy profile (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is in fact a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game where
agent i can choose Ci ≥ 0 in period 0 while agent j ̸= i cannot.
Suppose that, for t ≥ 1, we have a non-terminal history ht = {(C1, C2), (c01, c02), . . . , (ct−11 , c
t−1
2 )}
with the restrictions Ci ≥ 0 and Cj = 0. We let V̄i = Vi − Ci for notational convenience.
9
－ 38 －
Strategy ŝ∗i for agent i in the game with the restrictions Ci ≥ 0, Cj = 0, and i ̸= j.
Let ŝ∗i (h
0) = K−Vj . When i ̸= m(t), we require that ŝ∗i (ht) = 0 by the feasibility for contributions.
When i = m(t), the following descriptions define ŝ∗i (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let ŝ∗i (ht) = 0.
(ii) If V̄i ≤ Vj and 0 < xt−1 ≤ (1− δ)V̄i, then let ŝ∗i (ht) = xt−1.
(iii) If V̄i ≤ Vj and (1− δ)V̄i < xt−1 ≤ Vj , then let ŝ∗i (ht) = 0.
(iv) If V̄i ≤ Vj and Vj < xt−1 ≤ δV̄i + Vj , then let ŝ∗i (ht) = xt−1 − Vj .
(v) If V̄i ≤ Vj and δV̄i + Vj < xt−1, then let ŝ∗i (ht) = 0.
(vi) If Vj < V̄i and 0 < x
t−1 ≤ V̄i, then let ŝ∗i (ht) = xt−1.
(vii) If Vj < V̄i and V̄i < x
t−1, then let ŝ∗i (h
t) = 0.
Strategy ŝ∗∗j for agent j in the game with the restrictions Ci ≥ 0, Cj = 0, and i ̸= j.
We fix ŝ∗∗j (h
0) = 0 by the restriction Cj = 0. When j ̸= m(t), we require that ŝ∗∗j (ht) = 0 by the
feasibility for contributions. When j = m(t), the following descriptions define ŝ∗∗j (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = 0.
(ii) If Vj < V̄i and 0 < x
t−1 ≤ (1− δ)Vj , then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = xt−1.
(iii) If Vj < V̄i and (1− δ)Vj < xt−1 ≤ V̄i, then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = 0.
(iv) If Vj < V̄i and V̄i < x
t−1 ≤ δVj + V̄i, then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = xt−1 − V̄i.
(v) If Vj < V̄i and δVj + V̄i < x
t−1, then let ŝ∗∗j (h
t) = 0.
(vi) If V̄i ≤ Vj and 0 < xt−1 ≤ Vj , then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = xt−1.
(vii) If V̄i ≤ Vj and Vj < xt−1, then let ŝ∗∗j (ht) = 0.
Proposition 3. The strategy profile (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game with the
restrictions Ci ≥ 0, Cj = 0, and i ̸= j.
Proof. Suppose that any Ci ≥ 0 is given and Cj = 0 is fixed. Let V̄i = Vi − Ci and K̄ = K − Ci.
Take any non-terminal history ht with t ≥ 1. We will investigate the subgame starting at ht in the
following three cases.
First, consider the case where xt−1 ≤ 0. If t ≥ 2, then the project is completed in period t − 1
and the game ends at the period, so no subgame starts at ht. If t = 1, it is optimal for agent 1 to
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choose c11 = 0 at h
1 because choosing c11 > 0 simply lowers his payoff, considering that the project
is completed and the game ends even if he contributes nothing in period 1. This optimal choice for
agent 1 is described in Item (i) of the strategy ŝ∗1 or ŝ
∗∗





is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting at h1, no matter whether i = 1 or j = 1.
Second, consider the case where xt−1 > 0 and V̄i ≤ 0. Since agent i obtains a non-positive net
benefit on completion of the project, it is optimal for agent i to contribute nothing at ht and its
continuation histories. This optimal choice for agent i is described in the strategy ŝ∗i ; Item (iii) or (v)
in the descriptions of ŝ∗i applies here.
4 On the other hand, agent j obtains a positive benefit Vj on
completion of the project. Since his opponent is expected to contribute nothing in the future, if agent j
is on the move at ht or its continuation history, it is optimal for him to contribute enough and complete
the project immediately as long as the remaining amount does not exceed Vj . This optimal choice for
agent j is described in the strategy ŝ∗∗j ; Item (vi) or (vii) in the descriptions of ŝ
∗∗
j applies. Therefore,
the strategy profile induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting at h
t.
Third, consider the case where xt−1 > 0 and V̄i > 0. In this case, the facts discussed in the previous
section apply to the subgame starting at ht. Particularly, we focus on Facts 1 and 2 and the strategy
profile (s̄∗i , s̄
∗∗
j ) in the previous section. When V̄i ≤ Vj , the strategy ŝ∗i is defined in the same way as s̄∗i
while the strategy ŝ∗∗j is defined in the same way as s̄
∗∗
j . When Vj < V̄i, the strategy ŝ
∗
i is defined in
the same way as s̄∗∗j while the strategy ŝ
∗∗
j is defined in the same way as s̄
∗
i . So, by Facts 1 and 2, the
strategy profile induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting at h
t.
So far, we have shown that the strategy profile induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the subgame starting at any non-terminal history ht that continues after an arbitrary choice of Ci ≥ 0.
In other words, the strategy profile induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of any subgame
starting in period 1. We note that, in the equilibrium of each subgame starting in period 1, agent j’s
payoff must be non-negative because agent j can secure a payoff of zero in the subgame by choosing to
contribute nothing in the subgame.
We are left to show that ŝ∗i (h
0) = K − Vj is agent i’s optimal choice in period 0. In doing so, we
may assume that, in every subgame starting in period 1, agents i and j choose the strategy profile
induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ).
Suppose that i = 1, i.e., it is agent 1 that has an option to make a proposal C1 ≥ 0. When
C1 = K − V2, we have K̄ = K − C1 = V2, and V̄1 = V1 − C1 < V2 by our assumption V1 < K. In the
4When V̄i ≤ 0, Items (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii) in the descriptions of ŝ∗i never apply because the inequalities
in the descriptions do not hold.
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2 ) realizes a path such
that c11 = 0 and c
2
2 = K̄ with the period of completion T = 2, and agent 1’s payoff along the path is
δV̄1 = δ(V1 +V2 −K) > 0. We investigate whether agent 1 can get a payoff higher than δ(V1 +V2 −K)
by choosing C1 ̸= K − V2. In the subgame starting in period 1 after the choice of C1, agent 2’s payoff
is non-negative as we have mentioned above. By Lemma 1, agent 1’s payoff realized in the subgame
does not exceed δT−1(V1 + V2 − K). If T ≥ 2 by the choice of C1, agent 1’s payoff does not exceed
δ(V1 + V2 −K) since δ < 1. Since agent 2 does not have an opportunity to contribute before period 2,
if T = 1 by the choice of C1, then it must be the case that agent 1 bears all the cost of the project,
which makes agent 1’s payoff negative since V1 < K. Therefore, agent 1’s payoff cannot get higher than
δ(V1 + V2 −K) even if he chooses any C1 ̸= K − V2. So, ŝ∗1(h0) = K − V2 is agent 1’s optimal choice.
Suppose that i = 2, i.e., it is agent 2 that has an option to make a proposal C2 ≥ 0. When
C2 = K − V1, we have K̄ = K − C2 = V1, and V̄2 = V2 − C2 < V1 by our assumption V2 < K.





path such that c11 = K̄ with the period of completion T = 1, and agent 2’s payoff along the path is
V̄2 = V1 + V2 −K > 0. We investigate whether agent 2 can get a payoff higher than V1 + V2 −K by
choosing C2 ̸= K − V1. In the subgame starting in period 1 after the choice of C2, agent 1’s payoff is
non-negative as we have mentioned above. By Lemma 1, agent 2’s payoff realized in the subgame does
not exceed V1 + V2 −K since δ < 1. Therefore, agent 2’s payoff cannot get higher than V1 + V2 −K
even if he chooses any C2 ̸= K − V1. So, ŝ∗2(h0) = K − V1 is agent 2’s optimal choice.
In this section, we have considered the game where only one agent has an option to make a proposal
to commit to the final step. We point out two properties of the equilibria of the game.
First, the project is completed in equilibrium as long as completion of the project is socially de-
sirable: K < V1 + V2. This is in contrast with the fact that the project is not completed when
Vi < Vj < δVi + Vj < K < V1 + V2 in equilibrium of the game with the restrictions C1 = C2 = 0 in the
previous section.
Second, the agent with the option gets all the surplus while the other agent without the option
gets a payoff of zero. The option gives an advantage to the proposer because he comes to be able
to manipulate his net valuation and make it lower than his opponent’s valuation. The option also
gives him a chance to postpone his actual payment, which is another advantage to him. Although a
commitment to the final step seems a generous proposal at a glance, the commitment gives the proposer
a great advantage in his equilibrium payoff.
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5. The Results for the Two-Side Case
This section studies our model with the restriction in which both agents can make a proposal. The




(V1 + V2 −K)
for notational convenience. We have 0 < V̂ < Vi by our assumption 0 < Vi < K < V1 + V2 for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 4. If there is any subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) in the game with the restrictions
C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0, the equilibrium payoff profile (U∗1 , U∗2 ) ≡ (u1(s∗1, s∗2), u2(s∗1, s∗2)) is such that
(U∗1 , U
∗
2 ) = (δV̂ , V̂ ), which is realized along the equilibrium path, C1 = V1 − V̂ , C2 = V2 − V̂ , and
c11 = K − C1 − C2 = (1− δ)V̂ , with the period of completion T = 1.
Proof. The proposition is proved in four steps. Recall that we use the following notations: V̄1 =
V1 − C1, V̄2 = V2 − C2, and K̄ = K − C1 − C2.
Step 1. U∗1 ≥ δV̂ .
Proof of Step 1. We show that, for any value of V̄2, agent 1 can secure a payoff of δV̂ by choosing
C1 = V1 − V̂ , which means that when agent 1 optimally chooses C1 in the equilibrium (s∗1, s∗2), his





is realized in the subgame (V̄1, V̄2, K̄) starting in period 1. Note that V̄1 = V̂ for the choice of C1.
If V̄2 > V̂ , we have (1 − δ)V̄1 < K̄ < V̄2. This is because K̄ = K − (V1 − V̄1) − (V2 − V̄2) >
K − (V1 − V̂ ) − (V2 − V̂ ) = (1 − δ)V̂ = (1 − δ)V̄1 and V̄2 − K̄ = V1 + V2 − K − V̂ = δV̂ > 0. Since
0 < V̄1 < V̄2 and K̄ > 0, the facts discussed in Section 3 apply to the subgame (V̄1, V̄2, K̄) starting in
period 1. By Fact 5, c11 = 0 and c
2
2 = K̄ with the period of completion T = 2 in equilibrium of the
subgame, and hence agent 1’s equilibrium payoff in the subgame is δV̄1 = δV̂ .
If V̄2 ≤ V̂ , we have K̄ ≤ (1−δ)V̄1. If K̄ > 0, agent 1’s equilibrium payoff in the subgame (V̄1, V̄2, K̄)
is no less than δV̂ because agent 1 has an option to choose c11 = K̄, finish the game in T = 1, and
obtain a payoff V̄1 − K̄ ≥ V̄1 − (1 − δ)V̄1 = δV̄1 = δV̂ . If K̄ ≤ 0, it is optimal for agent 1 to choose
c11 = 0, finish the game in T = 1, and obtain a payoff V̄1 > δV̂ in the subgame.
Step 2. U∗2 ≥ V̂ .




2). We assume that,





When V̄1 > V̂ , consider agent 2’s choice C
′
2 = V2−V̂ . Let V̄ ′2 = V2−C′2 and K̄′ = K−C1−C′2. Note
that V̄ ′2 = V̂ for the choice of C
′
2. We have (1−δ)V̄ ′2 < K̄′ < V̄1 because K̄′ = K−(V1−V̄1)−(V2−V̂ ) >
K − (V1 − V̂ ) − (V2 − V̂ ) = (1 − δ)V̂ = (1 − δ)V̄ ′2 and V̄1 − K̄′ = V1 + V2 −K − V̂ = δV̂ > 0. Since
0 < V̄ ′2 < V̄1 and K̄




period 1. By Fact 4, c11 = K̄
′ with the period of completion T = 1 in equilibrium of the subgame, and
hence agent 2’s equilibrium payoff in the subgame is V̄ ′2 = V̂ . Since agent 2 can secure a payoff of V̂ by




2), we must have U
∗
2 ≥ V̂ .
When V̄1 ≤ V̂ , consider agent 2’s choice C′2 = V2 − V̂ + ε where 0 < ε < V̂ . Let V̄ ′2 = V2 − C′2
and K̄′ = K − C1 − C′2. Note that V̄ ′2 = V̂ − ε > 0. We have K̄′ < (1 − δ)V̄1 because K̄′ =
K − (V1 − V̄1) − (V2 − V̂ + ε) = V̄1 − δV̂ − ε < V̄1 − δV̄1 = (1 − δ)V̄1. If K̄′ > 0, we have V̄1 > 0
and Fact 3 applies to the subgame (V̄1, V̄
′
2 , K̄
′) starting in period 1. So, we have c11 = K̄
′ with the
period of completion T = 1 in equilibrium of the subgame, and hence agent 2’s equilibrium payoff in
the subgame is V̄ ′2 = V̂ − ε. If K̄′ ≤ 0, then it is optimal for agent 1 to choose c11 = 0 and finish the
game in T = 1. So, agent 2’s equilibrium payoff in the subgame is V̄ ′2 = V̂ − ε. When we consider
agent 2’s equilibrium payoff U∗2 in the whole game, we must have U
∗
2 ≥ V̂ − ε since agent 2 has an
option to choose C′2 = V2 − V̂ + ε. Since we can have ε > 0 arbitrarily close to 0, it must be the case
that U∗2 ≥ V̂ .
Step 3. In equilibrium, T = 1, U∗1 = δV̂ , U
∗
2 = V̂ , and C2 = V2 − V̂ .
Proof of Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 imply that U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≥ (1 + δ)V̂ = V1 + V2 − K while Lemma 1
implies that U∗1 + U
∗
2 ≤ δT−1(V1 + V2 − K). Since δ < 1, we must have T = 1 in equilibrium and
U∗1 + U
∗
2 = V1 + V2 −K. By Steps 1 and 2, we obtain U∗1 = δV̂ and U∗2 = V̂ .
Since T = 1 in equilibrium, the result U∗2 = V̂ implies that C2 = V2 − V̂ in equilibrium.
Step 4. In equilibrium, C1 = V1 − V̂ and c11 = (1− δ)V̂ .
Proof of Step 4. Suppose that C1 is agent 1’s choice in equilibrium. Let V̄1 = V1 − C1. By Step 3,
we have T = 1 and U∗1 = δV̂ in equilibrium. By the form of agent 1’s payoff function, we have
U∗1 = V̄1 − c11 = δV̂ . Considering c11 ≥ 0, we have V̄1 ≥ δV̂ . We will show V̄1 = V̂ in equilibrium.
First, suppose, by way of contradiction, that V̄1 < V̂ in equilibrium. Choose sufficiently small ε > 0
so that ε < δ(V̂ − V̄1) and ε < V2 − V̂ . Let C′2 = V2 − V̂ − ε, V̄ ′2 = V2 − C′2, and K̄′ = K − C1 − C′2.
Then, we have V̄ ′2 = V̂ + ε and K̄
′ = K − (V1 − V̄1) − (V2 − V̂ − ε) = V̄1 − δV̂ + ε ≥ ε. If agent 2
chooses C ′2 in period 0, then he enters the subgame (V̄1, V̄
′
2 , K̄
′) starting in period 1, to which the facts
discussed in Section 3 apply because 0 < V̄1 < V̄
′
2 and K̄
′ > 0. We note that K̄′ < (1 − δ)V̄1 since
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(1− δ)V̄1 − K̄′ = δ(V̂ − V̄1)− ε > 0. By Fact 3, we have c11 = K̄′ with the period of completion T = 1
in equilibrium of the subgame (V̄1, V̄
′
2 , K̄
′), in which agent 2’s equilibrium payoff is V̄ ′2 = V̂ + ε > V̂ .
This is in contradiction with the result U∗2 = V̂ in Step 3.
Second, suppose, by way of contradiction, that V̄1 > V̂ in equilibrium. Choose sufficiently small
ε > 0 so that ε < δV̂ , ε < V̄1 − V̂ , and ε < V̄2 − V̂ . Let C′2 = V2 − V̂ − ε, V̄ ′2 = V2 − C′2, and
K̄′ = K−C1−C′2. Then, we have V̄ ′2 = V̂ +ε and K̄′ = V̄1− δV̂ +ε > (1− δ)V̂ +ε. Note that V̄1 > V̄ ′2
since V̄1−V̄ ′2 = V̄1−V̂ −ε > 0. If agent 2 chooses C′2 in period 0, then he enters the subgame (V̄1, V̄ ′2 , K̄′)
starting in period 1, to which the facts discussed in Section 3 apply because 0 < V̄ ′2 < V̄1 and K̄
′ > 0.
We note that (1 − δ)V̄ ′2 < K̄′ < V̄1 since K̄′ − (1 − δ)V̄ ′2 > (1 − δ)V̂ + ε − (1 − δ)(V̂ + ε) = δε > 0
and V̄1 − K̄′ = δV̂ − ε > 0. By Fact 4, we have c11 = K̄′ with the period of completion T = 1 in
equilibrium of the subgame (V̄1, V̄
′
2 , K̄
′), in which agent 2’s equilibrium payoff is V̄ ′2 = V̂ + ε > V̂ . This
is in contradiction with the result U∗2 = V̂ in Step 3.
Therefore, we have V̄1 = V̂ in equilibrium, which implies that C1 = V1 − V̂ . Furthermore, in
equilibrium, we have c11 = (1− δ)V̂ since U∗1 = V̄1 − c11 = δV̂ .
Proposition 4 assumes the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2). We next show that
the following strategy profile (s̃∗i , s̃
∗∗
j ) is in fact a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that, for t ≥ 1, we have a non-terminal history ht = {(C1, C2), (c01, c02), . . . , (ct−11 , c
t−1
2 )}
with the restrictions C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0. We use the following notations: V̄1 = V1 −C1, V̄2 = V2 −C2,
and V̂ = (V1 + V2 −K)/(1 + δ).
Strategy s̃∗i for agent i in the game with the restrictions C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0.
Let s̃∗i (h
0) = Vi− V̂ . When i ̸= m(t), we require that s̃∗i (ht) = 0 by the feasibility for contributions.
When i = m(t), the following descriptions define s̃∗i (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let s̃∗i (ht) = 0.
(ii) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and 0 < xt−1 ≤ (1− δ)V̄i, then let s̃∗i (ht) = xt−1.
(iii) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and (1− δ)V̄i < xt−1 ≤ V̄j , then let s̃∗i (ht) = 0.
(iv) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and V̄j < xt−1 ≤ δV̄i + V̄j , then let s̃∗i (ht) = xt−1 − V̄j .
(v) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and δV̄i + V̄j < xt−1, then let s̃∗i (ht) = 0.
(vi) If V̄j < V̄i and 0 < x
t−1 ≤ V̄i, then let s̃∗i (ht) = xt−1.
(vii) If V̄j < V̄i and V̄i < x




Strategy s̃∗∗j for agent j in the game with the restrictions C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0.
Let s̃∗∗j (h
0) = Vj − V̂ . When j ̸= m(t), we require that s̃∗∗j (ht) = 0 by the feasibility for contribu-
tions. When j = m(t), the following descriptions define s̃∗∗j (h
t).
(i) If xt−1 ≤ 0, then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = 0.
(ii) If V̄j < V̄i and 0 < x
t−1 ≤ (1− δ)V̄j , then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = xt−1.
(iii) If V̄j < V̄i and (1− δ)V̄j < xt−1 ≤ V̄i, then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = 0.
(iv) If V̄j < V̄i and V̄i < x
t−1 ≤ δV̄j + V̄i, then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = xt−1 − V̄i.
(v) If V̄j < V̄i and δV̄j + V̄i < x
t−1, then let s̃∗∗j (h
t) = 0.
(vi) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and 0 < xt−1 ≤ V̄j , then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = xt−1.
(vii) If V̄i ≤ V̄j and V̄j < xt−1, then let s̃∗∗j (ht) = 0.
Proposition 5. The strategy profile (s̃∗i , s̃
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game with the
restrictions C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0.
Proof. Take any C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0. We use the following notations: V̄1 = V1 −C1, V̄2 = V2 −C2,
and K̄ = K − C1 − C2. We consider the subgame (V̄1, V̄2, K̄) starting in period 1.
Let us compare the strategy profile (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗





in this section. We note that the descriptions in Items (i) through (vii) are almost the same between
(ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗













Although Vj is a positive number by the assumption of our model, V̄j can be a non-positive number.
We here recall that Proposition 3 in Section 4 implies that the strategy profile induced by (ŝ∗i , ŝ
∗∗
j ) is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of any subgame (V̄i, Vj , K̄) investigated in the previous section. So, if
either V̄1 > 0 or V̄2 > 0 or both, then we can use the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 and
show that the strategy profile induced by (s̃∗i , s̃
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame
(V̄1, V̄2, K̄) investigated in this section. We do not repeat the arguments for the case: either V̄1 > 0 or
V̄2 > 0 or both.
However, in this section, it is possible that V̄1 ≤ 0 and V̄2 ≤ 0. In this case, we must have K̄ < 0
since K̄ = K−C1 −C2 = K− (V1 − V̄1)− (V2 − V̄2) ≤ K−V1 −V2 < 0, where the last inequality holds
by our assumption that completion of the project is socially desirable. When K̄ < 0, the project is
completed in period 1 and the game ends. It is optimal for agent 1 to choose c11 = 0 because choosing
c11 > 0 simply lowers his payoff, considering that the project is completed and the game ends even if he
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contributes nothing in period 1. This optimal choice for agent 1 is described in Item (i) of the strategy
s̃∗1 or s̃
∗∗




j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame
(V̄1, V̄2, K̄) also in this case: V̄1 ≤ 0 and V̄2 ≤ 0.
So far, we have shown that the strategy profile induced by (s̃∗i , s̃
∗∗
j ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the subgame (V̄1, V̄2, K̄) that continues after arbitrary choices of C1 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0. We are left
to show that s̃∗i (h
0) = Vi − V̂ and s̃∗∗j (h0) = Vj − V̂ are the optimal choices for agents i and j in
period 0. When C1 = V1− V̂ and C2 = V2− V̂ , we have V̄1 = V̄2 = V̂ > K̄ = (1− δ)V̂ . In the subgame









path such that c11 = K̄ with the period of completion T = 1, and agent 1’s payoff along the path is
V̄1 − K̄ = δV̂ while agent 2’s payoff along the path is V̄2 = V̂ . We investigate whether agent 1 or 2 can
get a higher payoff if he unilaterally changes the choice of C1 or C2. In doing so, we may assume that,
in every subgame starting in period 1, agents i and j choose the strategy profile induced by (s̃∗i , s̃
∗∗
j ).
First, we investigate agent 1’s deviation. Suppose that C2 = V2 − V̂ is given. If agent 1 chooses C1
such that 0 ≤ C1 < V1− V̂ , then Item (vi) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃∗∗1 applies to agent 1 at the history h1,
with c11 = K̄ chosen, and the game ends in period 1; his payoff is V̄1− K̄ = (V1−C1)− (K−C1−C2) =
V1 − K + V2 − V̂ = (1 + δ)V̂ − V̂ = δV̂ . If agent 1 chooses C1 such that V1 − V̂ < C1 < V1 − δV̂ ,
then Item (ii) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃
∗∗
1 applies to agent 1 at the history h
1, with c11 = K̄ chosen, and
the game ends in period 1; his payoff is V̄1 − K̄ = δV̂ . If agent 1 chooses C1 such that V1 − δV̂ ≤ C1,
then Item (i) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃
∗∗
1 applies to agent 1 at the history h
1, with c11 = 0 chosen, and
the game ends in period 1; his payoff V̄1 = V1 −C1 does not exceed δV̂ . So, agent 1’s payoff cannot be
higher than δV̂ even if he chooses C1 ≥ 0 such that C1 ̸= V1 − V̂ .
Second, we investigate agent 2’s deviation. Suppose that C1 = V1 − V̂ is given. If agent 2 chooses
C2 such that 0 ≤ C2 < V2 − V̂ , then Item (iii) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃∗∗1 applies to agent 1 at the




2 applies to agent 2 at the
history h2, with c22 = K̄ chosen, and the game ends in period 2; agent 2’s payoff is δ(V̄2 − K̄) =
δ((V2−C2)−(K−C1−C2)) = δ(V2−K+V1− V̂ ) = δ((1+δ)V̂ − V̂ ) = δ2V̂ . If agent 2 chooses C2 such
that V2 − V̂ < C2 < V2 − δV̂ , then Item (vi) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃∗∗1 applies to agent 1 at the history
h1, with c11 = K̄ chosen, and the game ends in period 1; agent 2’s payoff V̄2 = V2 − C2 is less than V̂ .
If agent 2 chooses C2 such that V2 − δV̂ ≤ C2, then Item (i) of the strategy s̃∗1 or s̃∗∗1 applies to agent 1
at the history h1, with c11 = 0 chosen, and the game ends in period 1; agent 2’s payoff V̄2 = V2 − C2
does not exceed δV̂ . So, agent 2’s payoff cannot be higher than V̂ even if he chooses C2 ≥ 0 such that
C2 ̸= V2 − V̂ .
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In this section, we have considered the game where both agents have options to make a proposal
to commit to the final step. We point out three properties of the equilibria of this game.
First, the project is completed in equilibrium as long as completion of the project is socially desir-
able: K < V1 + V2. This property is also held by the equilibria of the game where only one agent can
make a proposal.
Second, both agents get positive payoffs. We can say that the surplus is split relatively fairly
between the two agents in equilibrium of this game, compared to the game where only one agent or no
agent can propose.
Third, the second mover has an advantage. That is, agent 1 obtains a payoff of δV̂ while agent 2
obtains a payoff of V̂ in equilibrium. As the agents become more patient, i.e., as δ gets close to 1, the
second mover’s advantage becomes less.
6. Conclusion
We have investigated a two-player contribution game similar to the one studied by Compte and Je-
hiel [2003] but different in that our game assumes that agents can commit to make a certain amount
of payment at the final step of completing a joint project. We have analyzed how such commitments
to the final step can affect the equilibrium payoff profile in the game. We have shown the following.
In equilibrium of the game studied by Compte and Jehiel [2003], the agent with the lower valuation
of the project gets all the surplus generated by completion of the project while the agent with the
higher valuation gets a payoff of zero.
However, in equilibrium of our game where only one agent has an option to propose, the proposer
gets all the surplus while the other agent without the option gets a payoff of zero. The option gives
an advantage to the proposer because he comes to be able to manipulate his net valuation and make
it lower than his opponent’s valuation. The option also gives him such a chance to postpone his actual
payment, as is another advantage to him.
In equilibrium of our game where both agents can propose, the surplus is split relatively fairly
between the two in the sense that the both agents get positive payoffs, although the second mover’s
payoff exceeds that of the first mover.
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